


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CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Unrest is growing among Saigon students. (Page 1)

Korea-Japan: The exchange of propaganda barbs between North and South Korea could complicate resolution of the hijacking. (Page 2)

Guatemala: The likelihood of more kidnapings has increased. (Page 3)

Ecuador: Violence has again erupted in Quito from student unrest. (Page 4)

Peru: Communist nations are interested in the construction of a government-owned copper refinery. (Page 5)

Iraq: A major figure in the Iraqi Government appears to have been eclipsed. (Page 6)

Zambia: President Kaunda says he will deal harshly with politicians who threaten to split the ruling party. (Page 7)

Korea: Infiltration effort (Page 8)

Dominican Republic: Political impasse (Page 8)

Austria: Coalition talks (Page 9)

IAEA: Safeguards committee (Page 9)

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South Vietnam: Despite government efforts to calm the situation, unrest is growing among Saigon students over the recent arrest of several for Communist activity.

A student spokesman has announced that the nearly total class boycotts that began yesterday at Saigon University would last indefinitely unless the government either releases the accused students or brings them to an early civil trial. According to the US Embassy, strikes may spread to secondary schools.

On 1 April a number of student groups passed a resolution accusing the government of oppression, pledging to continue the strike until their demands are satisfied, and calling for support from students throughout the country. The groups are scheduled to meet again this weekend to plan further action. Meanwhile, some students reportedly have threatened to immolate or maim themselves in support of the protest.

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Further student protests are likely, especially because the accused students must be tried by a military field court, which is widely considered to be overly severe. So far student dissent has been restricted to passive forms of protest, and the students will probably try to avoid any violence that would provoke a government crackdown.

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Korea-Japan: The exchange of propaganda barbs between North and South Korea over the hijacked Japanese airliner, now at Pyongyang, could complicate resolution of the incident.

North Korea is clearly unhappy over playing host to the hijackers and denies it had any part in the affair or that it even welcomed the nine "Trotskyite" students responsible. Pyongyang now claims, however, that the exchange of the passengers for a Japanese official as hostage has changed the situation, and that it can no longer guarantee immediate release of the plane and those on board.

North Korea might decide to provide sanctuary for the hijackers, although its public attitude remains ambiguous. The return of the Japanese official, the three-man crew, and the plane probably will be arranged, but not before Pyongyang exacts what it can in terms of political tribute and prestige. If necessary, Japan is in a position to exert considerable leverage because it is an important source of North Korean imports.

For its part, South Korea is anxious to head off domestic criticism for allowing the Communist hijackers to escape with impunity. Seoul is playing up its tough stand in demanding that the passengers be spared a trip to "hell" before consenting at Japan's behest to the plane's departure.

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Guatemala: The state of siege and the government's resolve not to accede to leftist demands for the release of the West German ambassador have increased the likelihood of further incidents.

When the government announced that it would not release the 15 subversives demanded by the pro-Cuban Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the kidnapers upped their terms to 22 prisoners and \$700,000 in ransom. These actions appear designed to embarrass the government and could lead to its overthrow.

In the meantime, the FAR has indicated that if its demands are not met by 4 p.m. (EST) today, or if the government begins counterterrorist measures, it would execute Ambassador von Spreti.

If the FAR believes that the threats against the ambassador are not sufficient to achieve its demands, it may try to kidnap additional hostages from the diplomatic community. [redacted]

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The situation has led to increased concern within the diplomatic community in the past few days. [redacted]

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Ecuador: Violence has erupted in Quito as student unrest is again challenging government authority.

The ostensible issue this time, which has sparked violence of unusual intensity, was the closing of a girls' high school after a month-long struggle over the appointment of school administrators. Disciplined student militants are taking advantage of the issue to play up anti-Americanism, and the US-sponsored binational center has come under repeated sniper and bomb attacks. So far, seven students have been wounded during clashes with the police, and some military forces have been deployed to critical areas of the city.

The secondary and university students in Ecuador, historically highly critical of the government, are being led by extreme leftist students dedicated to bringing down the present regime. These leaders have utilized the government's at times inept and overly harsh reaction to student provocations to create the emotional atmosphere needed to draw out broad student support.

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Peru: Communist nations are interested in the construction of a government-owned copper refinery for Peru.

According to a leftist newspaper, Peru has received an offer from Yugoslavia. Talks on this as well as other projects probably were conducted by a Peruvian economic mission that recently visited Communist countries. [redacted]

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US mining companies strongly oppose a government-owned refinery, to which they would be forced to sell their output. Such a refinery, particularly one built with Communist aid, would jeopardize prospective investments by US mining companies, including the recently signed \$355-million contract for development of the Cuajone deposit in southern Peru. [redacted]

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Iraq: [A major figure in the Iraqi Government appears to have been eclipsed by his civilian rival in the additional cabinet changes announced yesterday.]

[Lieutenant General Hardan Tikriti, formerly minister of defense and acting commander of the air force, has been moved up into a previously vacant vice presidential post, as was the former minister of the interior, who had already ceased to exercise any real power.]

[The change is probably a further move in the continuing struggle for power among the regime's leaders, particularly between the military and civilian factions of the Baath Party. Last week's cabinet reshuffle had already eliminated two of Hardan's closest supporters.]

[The loss of the Defense Ministry could propel Hardan into a coup attempt while he still has some control over the army and air force. He is apparently extremely popular with the Iraqi Army, although the units considered most loyal to him have been posted away from Baghdad.]

[The new appointments probably represent a victory for Saddam Tikriti, a doctrinaire Baathist who is considered more anti-US, more leftist, more obstinate, and more ruthless than the pragmatic Hardan. Saddam's ascendancy may not significantly affect Iraq's basic policies. The new ministers of defense and interior are considered to be yes-men who will pose no challenge to the continued control of President Bakr and Saddam.]



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Zambia: President Kaunda has again served notice that he will deal harshly with politicians who threaten to split the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP).

In a mid-March speech, he attacked tribally oriented politicians in the Copperbelt, Zambia's industrial center, for endangering efforts to build national unity. He also ordered extensive personnel changes that affected almost all officials holding top government and party posts in this region.

Kaunda's actions may have been directed primarily at Vice President Kapwepwe's aggressive Bemba following, which is the focus of tribal factionalism in Zambia. Kapwepwe forces have been especially active in tribal politics in the Copperbelt recently.

[redacted] the personnel changes removed several officials involved in organizing Bemba tribesmen in the Copperbelt.]

Kaunda carefully avoided giving the anti-Kapwepwe forces a complete victory, however. In one Copperbelt center, he warned the local party unit to purge itself of tribal attitudes or face a ban on political activity. Members of this unit had earlier charged Kaunda with favoritism toward the Bemba.

Kaunda's moves are a partial answer to the doubts that were raised about his determination to crush tribal politics when he assumed personal control of UNIP last August. Although he cannot halt divisive tribalism, he may eventually induce party officials to keep factionalism down to manageable proportions in order to protect their own careers.

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Korea: [Pyongyang's infiltration effort is continuing. A North Korean agent vessel was intercepted and sunk by a ROK patrol craft about 100 miles southwest of Seoul yesterday, in an area that experienced considerable infiltration by sea last year. Another infiltration apparently occurred on the southeast coast early last month. Two agents, who probably landed in a boat found beached there, were killed by South Korean Marines on 30 March. These incidents seem to have involved political agents ordered to develop an underground party structure in the South rather than to conduct sabotage or terrorism. There has been no known landing of paramilitary agents since March 1969.]

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Dominican Republic: [Both President Balaguer and the opposition have hardened their bargaining positions.]

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[The seven parties have reiterated their determination to abstain from the elections in May in the face of Balaguer's flat refusal to resign. The opposition may now seek new forms of pressure, perhaps by threatening a labor strike in the capital. Extremist elements will continue to provoke the street demonstrations that have plagued the country in recent weeks.]

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Austria: Coalition talks are proceeding slowly between the Socialists, victors in the parliamentary election on 1 March, and the People's Party. A new government is not likely to be formed before late April at the earliest. Negotiators are still discussing programs, the thorniest of which appears to be electoral reform. The allotment of ministerial portfolios has not yet been considered. Chancellor-designate Kreisky is warning publicly that if the People's Party proves intransigent, his Socialists may form a minority government with the support of a few independent conservatives.

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IAEA: [The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established a safeguards committee to consider its responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The committee will consider the proper IAEA position in the forthcoming negotiations with the nonnuclear-weapons states who are party to the NPT on safeguards arrangements required by the treaty. The terms of reference for the committee are not clear, and the Soviets are expected to press for strict adherence to the IAEA's so-called draft model agreement with Finland. In doing so, they would be seeking an application of safeguards that would give the IAEA a comprehensive inspection role. The EURATOM powers, on the other hand, do not want the IAEA to take any action that could infringe upon EURATOM's own safeguards system.]

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